A Legal Look: The Good Friday Agreement

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In recent years, Irish unity has become a growing topic of conversation in Ireland and  the United States. Recent political, economic, and social developments in Ireland has fueled the growing conversation.  

 When the topic of unification arises, the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) (Irish: “Comhaontú [ ko:i:ntu]  Aoine [i:n’ǝ]  an [ǝn]”) is usually mentioned in the mix. For some, questions remain about the GFA.

What does the GFA say about unification? How did it come about? What expectations should we have from the British and Irish governments towards unification under the GFA? The first step to answering these questions is to look at the history of the GFA.

In 1981, a seventeen-year political journey was launched that would bring peace to the north. The journey was embarked upon that same year by ten men who died on hunger strike in the H-Blocks of Long Kesh prison. They would never know the broader impact that their sacrifice would have on peace in the region.


The hunger strike drew worldwide attention by illuminating the plight of the nationalist community in the north, both politically and socially. But it was the men who died on hunger strike that forced the revolutionary change in the political and governmental structure of the north. By opening the door to political participation for nationalists in the north, the hunger strikers set a political course with a terminus that would become the GFA.  

Less than 30 days after the hunger strike ended, Sinn Féin, the political arm of the Provisional IRA at that time, entered the political arena, and “stood” candidates for election. In turn, the British government, recognizing the impact that Sinn Féin’s entry into elective politics would have on northern politics, enhanced its involvement in the political process in the north.

By 1982, the British government began developing plans for a “devolved form of government” in the north. The plan would allow self-governance in the north with all political sides participating in the process. This was a precursor to what is now the Northern Ireland Assembly.

By 1988, Sinn Féin and the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) held multiple elected offices in the north. That same year, the leaders of the two parties, Sinn Féin’s Gerry Adams, and the SDLP’s John Hume, initiated talks with one another to explore how a political solution could be crafted to bring peace to the north. Unfortunately, the talks stalled nine months later.

In 1991, secret talks took place between the Provisional IRA and MI6, the British government’s secret intelligence agency, seeking to bring an end to the ongoing guerilla war in the north.

By October 1993, Adams and Hume resumed their private talks. Subsequently, they sent a proposal to then Taoiseach Albert Reynolds to bring an end to the Troubles. Later in that year, the Taoiseach and then Prime Minister John Major put forth the “Downing Street Declaration,” which set out a vision plan to establish peace in the north.

A key event occurred in 1994, when the Provisional IRA announced a total cessation of its military activities. Forty-three days later, the loyalist paramilitary organizations followed suit.

In 1995, an “official” meeting between Sinn Féin and the British government took place to discuss the prospects of peace in the north. A year later however, the British government cut off talks with Sinn Féin following the Provisional IRA bombing of the docklands in London, ending its cessation of military activities.

In 1997, Tony Blair became the Prime Minister of Britain. Shortly after assuming office, Blair delivered a speech in Belfast pleading with northern Republicans to reengage in the settlement discussions. Two months after Blairs Belfast speech, the Provisional IRA reinstated its cessation of military activities, which cleared the way for Sinn Féin to reengage in settlement talks with Britain.

In September of 1997, settlement talks commenced at Stormont in Belfast. Former United States Senator George Mitchell chaired the talks, with the Ulster Unionist Party, Sinn Féin, the Republic of Ireland, and the British government participating. The Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and other entrenched unionist parties walked out of the talks.

On April 10, 1998, The Good Friday Agreement was signed in Belfast by the parties who participated in the talks.  

The GFA consists of two agreements, with accompanying “Annexes” (collectively, the “Agreements”). The first agreement, the “Multi-Party Agreement,” was signed by all the parties who participated in the settlement talks.

The second agreement, the “British-Irish Agreement”, was signed by the Prime Minister of Britain and the Taoiseach of Ireland. Of the thirty-two pages that comprise the GFA, only six pages govern the process for unification.

The Agreements share several key provisions that are critical to the unification process. The Multi-Party Agreement provisions (located in the section, titled, “Constitutional Issues,” paragraph 1, subsections (i), (ii), and (iv)), and The British-Irish Agreement, (located in Article 1, “The Two Governments, subsections (i), (ii), and (iv)) mutually provide that the participants,

“recognise [sic] the legitimacy of whatever choice is freely exercised by a majority of the people of Northern Ireland with regard to its status, whether they prefer to continue to support the Union with Great Britain or a sovereign united Ireland;

recognise  [sic] that it is for the people of the island of Ireland alone, by agreement between the two parts respectively and without external impediment, to exercise their right of self-determination on the basis of consent, freely and concurrently given, North and South, to bring about a united Ireland, if that is their wish, accepting that this right must be achieved and exercised with and subject to the agreement and consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland;

[and] affirm that if, in the future, the people of the island of Ireland exercise their right of self-determination on the basis set out in sections (i) and (ii) above to bring about a united Ireland, it will be a binding obligation on both Governments to introduce and support in their respective Parliaments legislation to give effect to that wish.”

Annex “A” to the Multi-Party Agreement, “Draft Clauses” (subsequently enacted by the British government), section 1., subsections (1) and (2), and section 2., specify that:

“1. (1) It is hereby declared that Northern Ireland in its entirety remains part of the United Kingdom and shall not cease to be so without the consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland voting in a poll held for the purposes of this section in accordance with Schedule 1.

(2) But if the wish expressed by a majority in such a poll is that Northern Ireland should cease to be part of the United Kingdom and form part of a united Ireland, the Secretary of State shall lay before Parliament such proposals to give effect to that wish as may be agreed between Her Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of Ireland.

 2. The Government of Ireland Act 1920 [creating two separate governments for the north and south] is repealed; and this Act shall have effect notwithstanding any other previous enactment.”   

“Schedule 1 of Annex A (specifying when a unification poll may be called), is the key provision necessary to initiate the unification process. It provides that, for purposes of section 1 to the Annex that,

1. The Secretary of State [of Northern Ireland] may by order direct the holding of a poll for the purposes of section 1 [unification] on a date specified in the order.

2. … the Secretary of State shall exercise the power under paragraph 1 if at any time it appears likely to him [or her] that a majority of those voting would express a wish that Northern Ireland should cease to be part of the United Kingdom and form part of a united Ireland.”

Additionally, the Republic amended the Irish Constitution to recognize, “…that a united Ireland shall be brought about only by peaceful means with the consent of a majority of the people, democratically expressed, in both jurisdictions in the island.” With the GFA in place, the question now turns to British-Irish adherence to its provisions and planning.

Understanding the critical provisions of the GFA allows focus to be drawn down to what is expected from the British and Irish governments on unification. Questions remain on how the respective governments will conduct anticipatory planning for unification.

Issues such as funding, how infrastructure, social services, healthcare, pensions, political representation, and how multiple other contingencies will be implemented remain unaddressed. To that point, once a border poll is called, it will likely be too late to implement any meaningful plan.

Regardless of one’s position on the question of unification, it behooves the British and Irish governments to plan for such a contingency. As support for unification grows, a conversation on the issue must be had that is grounded in substance.

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